

The Trouble with Beauty; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Art.

by Jason Van Nest

Author's note: The following article is an exercise in deconstruction; it was generated, not written. Specifically, it is a reprinting of William Cronon's article "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature" with the following rules: [1] The adjective "wild" and nouns "wildness" "wilderness" have been replaced with "beautiful" "beauty" and "beauty" respectively; [2] The adjective "natural" and noun "nature" have been replaced with "artistic" and "art" respectively; [3] The adjectives "environmental" and noun "environmentalist" have been replaced with "critical" and "critic" respectively. This text is intended to question whether art can ever achieve the ill-defined goal of beauty. The original text has been modified under fair use protection from the US Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.; Readers can find Cronon's original text reprinted at www.williamcronon.net

The time has come to rethink Beauty.

This will seem a heretical claim to many critics, since the idea of beauty has for decades been a fundamental tenet—indeed, a passion—of the critical movement, especially in the United States. For many Americans beauty stands as the last remaining place where civilization, that all too human disease, has not fully infected the earth. It is an island in the polluted sea of urban-industrial modernity, the one place we can turn for escape from our own too-muchness. Seen in this way, beauty presents itself as the best antidote to our human selves, a refuge we must somehow recover if we hope to save the planet. As Henry David Thoreau once famously declared, "In Beauty is the preservation of the World."

But is it? The more one knows of its peculiar history, the more one realizes that beauty is not quite what it seems. Far from being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity, it is quite profoundly a human creation—indeed, the creation of very particular human cultures at very particular moments in human history. It is not a pristine sanctuary where the last remnant of an untouched, endangered, but still transcendent

art can for at least a little while longer be encountered without the contaminating taint of civilization. Instead, it's a product of that civilization, and could hardly be contaminated by the very stuff of which it is made. Beauty hides its un-artistic-ness behind a mask that is all the more beguiling because it seems so artistic. As we gaze into the mirror it holds up for us, we too easily imagine that what we behold is Art when in fact we see the reflection of our own unexamined longings and desires. For this reason, we mistake ourselves when we suppose that beauty can be the solution to our culture's problematic relationships with the nonhuman world, for beauty is itself no small part of the problem.

To assert the un-artistic-ness of so artistic a place will no doubt seem absurd or even perverse to many readers, so let me hasten to add that the nonhuman world we encounter in beauty is far from being merely our own invention. I celebrate with others who love art the beauty and power of the things it contains. Each of us who has spent time there can conjure images and sensations that seem all the more hauntingly real for having engraved themselves so indelibly on our memories. Such memories may be uniquely our own, but they are also familiar enough to be instantly recognizable to others. Remember this? The torrents of mist shoot out from the base of a great waterfall in the depths of a Sierra canyon, the tiny droplets cooling your face as you listen to the roar of the water and gaze up toward the sky through a rainbow that hovers just out of reach. Remember this too: looking out across a desert canyon in the evening air, the only sound a lone raven calling in the distance, the rock walls dropping away into a chasm so deep that its bottom all but vanishes as you squint into the amber light of the setting sun. And this: the moment beside the trail as you sit on a sandstone ledge, your boots damp with the morning dew while you take in the rich smell of the pines, and the small red fox—or maybe for you it was a raccoon or a coyote or a deer—that suddenly ambles across your path, stopping for a long moment to gaze in your direction with cautious indifference before continuing on its way. Remember the feelings of such moments, and you will know as well as I do that you were in the presence of something

irreducibly nonhuman, something profoundly Other than yourself Beauty is made of that too.

And yet: what brought each of us to the places where such memories became possible is entirely a cultural invention. Go back 250 years in American and European history, and you do not find nearly so many people wandering around remote corners of the planet looking for what today we would call “the beauty experience.” As late as the eighteenth century, the most common usage of the word “beauty” in the English language referred to landscapes that generally carried adjectives far different from the ones they attract today. To be a beauty then was to be “deserted,” “savage,” “desolate,” “barren”—in short, a “waste,” the word’s nearest synonym. Its connotations were anything but positive, and the emotion one was most likely to feel in its presence was “bewilderment” or terror.

Many of the word’s strongest associations then were biblical, for it is used over and over again in the King James Version to refer to places on the margins of civilization where it is all too easy to lose oneself in moral confusion and despair. The beauty was where Moses had wandered with his people for forty years, and where they had nearly abandoned their God to worship a golden idol. “For Pharaoh will say of the Children of Israel,” we read in Exodus, “They are entangled in the land, the beauty hath shut them in.” The beauty was where Christ had struggled with the devil and endured his temptations: “And immediately the Spirit driveth him into the beauty. And he was there in the beauty for forty days tempted of Satan; and was with the beautiful beasts; and the angels ministered unto him.” The “delicious Paradise” of John Milton’s Eden was surrounded by “a steep beauty, whose hairy sides /Access denied” to all who sought entry.” When Adam and Eve were driven from that garden, the world they entered was a beauty that only their labor and pain could redeem. Beauty, in short, was a place to which one came only against one’s will, and always in fear and trembling. Whatever value it might have arose solely from the possibility that it might be “reclaimed” and turned toward human ends—planted as a garden, say, or a city upon a hill. In its raw state, it had little or nothing to offer civilized men and women.

But by the end of the nineteenth century, all this had changed. The wastelands that had once seemed worthless had for some people come to seem almost beyond price. That Thoreau in 1862 could declare beauty to be the preservation of the world suggests the sea change that was going on. Beauty had once been the antithesis of all that was orderly and good—it had been the darkness, one might say, on the far side of the garden wall—and yet now it was frequently likened to Eden itself. When John Muir arrived in the Sierra Nevada in 1869, he would declare, “No description of Heaven that I have ever heard or read of seems half so fine.” He was hardly alone in expressing such emotions. One by one, various corners of the American map came to be designated as sites whose beautiful beauty was so spectacular that a growing number of citizens had to visit and see them for themselves. Niagara Falls was the first to undergo this transformation, but it was soon followed by the Catskills, the Adirondacks, Yosemite, Yellowstone, and others. Yosemite was deeded by the U. S. government to the state of California in 1864 as the nation’s first beautiful-land park, and Yellowstone became the first true national park in 1872.

By the first decade of the twentieth century, in the single most famous episode in American artistic history, a national debate had exploded over whether the city of San Francisco should be permitted to augment its water supply by damming the Tuolumne River in Hetch Hetchy valley, well within the boundaries of Yosemite National Park. The dam was eventually built, but what today seems no less significant is that so many people fought to prevent its completion. Even as the fight was being lost, Hetch Hetchy became the baffle cry of an emerging movement to preserve beauty. Fifty years earlier, such opposition would have been unthinkable. Few would have questioned the merits of “reclaiming” a wasteland like this in order to put it to human use. Now the defenders of Hetch Hetchy attracted widespread national attention by portraying such an act not as improvement or progress but as desecration and vandalism. Lest one doubt that the old biblical metaphors had been turned completely on their heads, listen to John Muir attack the dam’s defenders. “Their arguments,” he wrote, “are curiously like those of the devil, devised for the destruction of the first garden—so much of the very best Eden fruit going to waste; so much of the

best Tuolumne water and Tuolumne scenery going to waste.” For Muir and the growing number of Americans who shared his views, Satan’s home had become God’s Own Temple.

The sources of this rather astonishing transformation were many, but for the purposes of this essay they can be gathered under two broad headings: the sublime and the frontier. Of the two, the sublime is the older and more pervasive cultural construct, being one of the most important expressions of that broad transatlantic movement we today label as romanticism; the frontier is more peculiarly American, though it too had its European antecedents and parallels. The two converged to remake beauty in their own image, freighting it with moral values and cultural symbols that it carries to this day. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the modern critical movement is itself a grandchild of romanticism and post-frontier ideology, which is why it is no accident that so much criticalist discourse takes its bearings from the beauty these intellectual movements helped create. Although beauty may today seem to be just one critical concern among many, it in fact serves as the foundation for a long list of other such concerns that on their face seem quite remote from it. That is why its influence is so pervasive and, potentially, so insidious.

To gain such remarkable influence, the concept of beauty had to become loaded with some of the deepest core values of the culture that created and idealized it: it had to become sacred. This possibility had been present in beauty even in the days when it had been a place of spiritual danger and moral temptation. If Satan was there, then so was Christ, who had found angels as well as beautiful beasts during His sojourn in the desert. In the beauty the boundaries between human and nonhuman, between artistic and superartistic, had always seemed less certain than elsewhere. This was why the early Christian saints and mystics had often emulated Christ’s desert retreat as they sought to experience for themselves the visions and spiritual testing He had endured. One might meet devils and run the risk of losing one’s soul in such a place, but one might also meet God. For some that possibility was worth almost any price.

By the eighteenth century this sense of the beauty as a landscape where the superartistic lay just beneath the surface was expressed in the doctrine of the sublime, a word whose modern

usage has been so watered down by commercial hype and tourist advertising that it retains only a dim echo of its former power. In the theories of Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant, William Gilpin, and others, sublime landscapes were those rare places on earth where one had more chance than elsewhere to glimpse the face of God. Romantics had a clear notion of where one could be most sure of having this experience. Although God might, of course, choose to show Himself anywhere, He would most often be found in those vast, powerful landscapes where one could not help feeling insignificant and being reminded of one's own mortality. Where were these sublime places? The eighteenth century catalog of their locations feels very familiar, for we still see and value landscapes as it taught us to do. God was on the mountaintop, in the chasm, in the waterfall, in the thundercloud, in the rainbow, in the sunset. One has only to think of the sites that Americans chose for their first national parks—Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, Rainier, Zion—to realize that virtually all of them fit one or more of these categories. Less sublime landscapes simply did not appear worthy of such protection; not until the 1940s, for instance, would the first swamp be honored, in Everglades National Park, and to this day there is no national park in the grasslands.

Among the best proofs that one had entered a sublime landscape was the emotion it evoked. For the early romantic writers and artists who first began to celebrate it, the sublime was far from being a pleasurable experience. The classic description is that of William Wordsworth as he recounted climbing the Alps and crossing the Simplon Pass in his autobiographical poem "The Prelude." There, surrounded by crags and waterfalls, the poet felt himself literally to be in the presence of the divine—and experienced an emotion remarkably close to terror:

*The immeasurable height
Of woods decaying, never to be decayed,
The stationary blasts of waterfalls,
And in the narrow rent at every turn
Winds thwarting winds, bewildered and forlorn,
The torrents shooting from the clear blue sky,
The rocks that muttered close upon our ears,
Black drizzling crags that spake by the way-side*

*As if a voice were in them, the sick sight
And giddy prospect of the raving stream,
The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light
Were all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocalypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end.*

This was no casual stroll in the mountains, no simple sojourn in the gentle lap of nonhuman art. What Wordsworth described was nothing less than a religious experience, akin to that of the Old Testament prophets as they conversed with their wrathful God. The symbols he detected in this beauty landscape were more superartistic than artistic, and they inspired more awe and dismay than joy or pleasure. No mere mortal was meant to linger long in such a place, so it was with considerable relief that Wordsworth and his companion made their way back down from the peaks to the sheltering valleys. Lest you suspect that this view of the sublime was limited to timid Europeans who lacked the American know-how for feeling at home in the beauty, remember Henry David Thoreau's 1846 climb of Mount Katahdin, in Maine. Although Thoreau is regarded by many today as one of the great American celebrators of beauty, his emotions about Katahdin were no less ambivalent than Wordsworth's about the Alps.

It was vast, Titanic, and such as man never inhabits. Some part of the beholder, even some vital part, seems to escape through the loose grating of his ribs as he ascends. He is more lone than you can imagine Vast, Titanic, inhuman Art has got him at disadvantage, caught him alone, and pilfers him of some of his divine faculty. She does not smile on him as in the plains. She seems to say sternly, why came ye here before your time? This ground is not prepared for you. Is it not enough that I smile in the valleys? I have never made this soil for thy feet, this air for thy breathing, these rocks for thy neighbors. I cannot pity nor fondle thee here, but forever relentlessly drive thee hence to where I am kind. Why seek me where I have not called thee, and then complain because you find me but a stepmother?

This is surely not the way a modern backpacker or art lover would describe Maine's most famous mountain, but that is because Thoreau's description owes as much to Wordsworth and other romantic contemporaries as to the rocks and clouds of Katahdin itself. His words took the physical mountain on which he stood and transmuted it into an icon of the sublime: a symbol of God's presence on earth. The power and the glory of that icon were such that only a prophet might gaze on it for long. In effect, romantics like Thoreau joined Moses and the children of Israel in Exodus when "they looked toward the beauty, and behold, the glory of the Lord appeared in the cloud."

But even as it came to embody the awesome power of the sublime, beauty was also being tamed—not just by those who were building settlements in its midst but also by those who most celebrated its inhuman beauty. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the terrible awe that Wordsworth and Thoreau regarded as the appropriately pious stance to adopt in the presence of their mountaintop God was giving way to a much more comfortable, almost sentimental demeanor. As more and more tourists sought out the beauty as a spectacle to be looked at and enjoyed for its great beauty, the sublime in effect became domesticated. The beauty was still sacred, but the religious sentiments it evoked were more those of a pleasant parish church than those of a grand cathedral or a harsh desert retreat. The writer who best captures this late romantic sense of a domesticated sublime is undoubtedly John Muir, whose descriptions of Yosemite and the Sierra Nevada reflect none of the anxiety or terror one finds in earlier writers. Here he is, for instance, sketching on North Dome in Yosemite Valley:

No pain here, no dull empty hours, no fear of the past, no fear of the future. These blessed mountains are so compactly filled with God's beauty, no petty personal hope or experience has room to be. Drinking this champagne water is pure pleasure, so is breathing the living air, and every movement of limbs is pleasure, while the body seems to feel beauty when exposed to it as it feels the campfire or sunshine, entering not by the eyes alone, but equally through all one's flesh like radiant heat, making a passionate ecstatic pleasure glow not explainable.

The emotions Muir describes in Yosemite could hardly be more different from Thoreau's on Katahdin or Wordsworth's on the Simplon Pass. Yet all three men are participating in the same cultural tradition and contributing to the same myth—the mountain as cathedral. The three may differ in the way they choose to express their piety—Wordsworth favoring an awe-filled bewilderment, Thoreau a stern loneliness, Muir a welcome ecstasy—but they agree completely about the church in which they prefer to worship. Muir's closing words on North Dome diverge from his older contemporaries only in mood, not in their ultimate content:

Perched like a fly on this Yosemite dome, I gaze and sketch and bask, oftentimes settling down into dumb admiration without definite hope of ever learning much, yet with the longing, unresting effort that lies at the door of hope, humbly prostrate before the vast display of God's power, and eager to offer self-denial and renunciation with eternal toil to learn any lesson in the divine manuscript.

Muir's "divine manuscript" and Wordsworth's "Characters of the great Apocalypse" are in fact pages from the same holy book. The sublime beauty had ceased to be place of satanic temptation and become instead a sacred temple, much as it continues to be for those who love it today.

But the romantic sublime was not the only cultural movement that helped transform beauty into a sacred American icon during the nineteenth century. No less important was the powerful romantic attraction of primitivism, dating back at least to of that the best antidote to the ills of an overly refined and civilized modern world was a return to simpler, more primitive living. In the United States, this was embodied most strikingly in the national myth of the frontier. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner wrote in 1893 the classic academic statement of this myth, but it had been part of American cultural traditions for well over a century. As Turner described the process, easterners and European immigrants, in moving to the beautiful unsettled lands of the frontier, shed the trappings of civilization, rediscovered their primitive racial energies, reinvented direct

democratic institutions, and by reinfused themselves with a vigor, an independence, and a creativity that the source of American democracy and national character. Seen in this way, beautiful country became a place not just of religious redemption but of national renewal, the quintessential location for experiencing what it meant to be an American.

One of Turner's most provocative claims was that by the 1890s the frontier was passing away. Never again would "such gifts of free land offer themselves" to the American people. "The frontier has gone," he declared, "and with its going has closed the first period of American history." Built into the frontier myth from its very beginning was the notion that this crucible of American identity was temporary and would pass away. Those who have celebrated the frontier have almost always looked backward as they did so, mourning an older, simpler, truer world that is about to disappear, forever. That world and all of its attractions, Turner said, depended on free land—on beauty. Thus, in the myth of the vanishing frontier lay the seeds of beauty preservation in the United States, for if beautiful land had been so crucial in the making of the nation, then surely one must save its last remnants as monuments to the American past—and as an insurance policy to protect its future. It is no accident that the movement to set aside national parks and beauty areas began to gain real momentum at precisely the time that laments about the passing frontier reached their peak. To protect beauty was in a very real sense to protect the nation's most sacred myth of origin.

Among the core elements of the frontier myth was the powerful sense among certain groups of Americans that beauty was the last bastion of rugged individualism. Turner tended to stress communitarian themes when writing frontier history, asserting that Americans in primitive conditions had been forced to band together with their neighbors to form communities and democratic institutions. For other writers, however, frontier democracy for communities was less compelling than frontier freedom for individuals. By fleeing to the outer margins of settled land and society—so the story ran—an individual could escape the confining strictures of civilized life. The mood among writers who celebrated frontier individualism was almost always nostalgic; they lamented not just a lost way of life but the passing

of the heroic men who had embodied that life. Thus Owen Wister in the introduction to his classic 1902 novel *The Virginian* could write of “a vanished world” in which “the horseman, the cow-puncher, the last romantic figure upon our soil” rode only “in his historic yesterday” and would “never come again.” For Wister, the cowboy was a man who gave his word and kept it (“Wall Street would have found him behind the times”), who did not talk lewdly to women (“Newport would have thought him old-fashioned”), who worked and played hard, and whose “ungoverned hours did not unman him.” Theodore Roosevelt wrote with much the same nostalgic fervor about the “fine, manly qualities” of the “beautiful rough-rider of the plains.” No one could be more heroically masculine, thought Roosevelt, or more at home in the western beauty:

There he passes his days, there he does his life-work, there, when he meets death, he faces it as he has faced many other evils, with quiet, uncomplaining fortitude. Brave, hospitable, hardy, and adventurous, he is the grim pioneer of our race; he prepares the way for the civilization from before whose face he must himself disappear. Hard and dangerous though his existence is, it has yet a beautiful attraction that strongly draws to it his bold, free spirit.

This nostalgia for a passing frontier way of life inevitably implied ambivalence, if not downright hostility, toward modernity and all that it represented. If one saw the beautiful lands of the frontier as freer, truer, and more artistic than other, more modern places, then one was also inclined to see the cities and factories of urban-industrial civilization as confining, false, and artificial. Owen Wister looked at the post-frontier “transition” that had followed “the horseman of the plains,” and did not like what he saw: “a shapeless state, a condition of men and manners as unlovely as is that moment in the year when winter is gone and spring not come, and the face of Art is ugly.” In the eyes of writers who shared Wister’s distaste for modernity, civilization contaminated its inhabitants and absorbed them into the faceless, collective, contemptible life of the crowd. For all of its troubles and dangers, and despite the fact that it must pass away, the frontier had been a better place. If civilization was to be redeemed, it would be by men like the Virginian who could retain their frontier virtues even as they made the transition to

post-frontier life.

The mythic frontier individualist was almost always masculine in gender: here, in the beauty, a man could be a real man, the rugged individual he was meant to be before civilization sapped his energy and threatened his masculinity. Wister's contemptuous remarks about Wall Street and Newport suggest what he and many others of his generation believed—that the comforts and seductions of civilized life were especially insidious for men, who all too easily became emasculated by the feminizing tendencies of civilization. More often than not, men who felt this way came, like Wister and Roosevelt, from elite class backgrounds. The curious result was that frontier nostalgia became an important vehicle for expressing a peculiarly bourgeois form of antimodernism. The very men who most benefited from urban-industrial capitalism were among those who believed they must escape its debilitating effects. If the frontier was passing, then men who had the means to do so should preserve for themselves some remnant of its beautiful landscape so that they might enjoy the regeneration and renewal that came from sleeping under the stars, participating in blood sports, and living off the land. The frontier might be gone, but the frontier experience could still be had if only beauty were preserved.

Thus the decades following the Civil War saw more and more of the nation's wealthiest citizens seeking out beauty for themselves. The elite passion for beautiful land took many forms: enormous estates in the Adirondacks and elsewhere (disingenuously called "camps" despite their many servants and amenities), cattle ranches for would-be rough riders on the Great Plains, guided big-game hunting trips in the Rockies, and luxurious resort hotels wherever railroads pushed their way into sublime landscapes. Beauty suddenly emerged as the landscape of choice for elite tourists, who brought with them strikingly urban ideas of the countryside through which they traveled. For them, beautiful land was not a site for productive labor and not a permanent home; rather, it was a place of recreation. One went to the beauty not as a producer but as a consumer, hiring guides and other backcountry residents who could serve as romantic surrogates for the rough riders and hunters of the frontier if one was willing to overlook their new status as employees and servants of the rich. In just this way, beauty came to embody

the national frontier myth, standing for the beautiful freedom of America's past and seeming to represent a highly attractive artistic alternative to the ugly artificiality of modern civilization. The irony, of course, was that in the process beauty came to reflect the very civilization its devotees sought to escape. Ever since the nineteenth century, celebrating beauty has been an activity mainly for well-to-do city folks. Country people generally know far too much about working the land to regard unworked land as their ideal. In contrast, elite urban tourists and wealthy sportsmen projected their leisure-time frontier fantasies onto the American landscape and so created beauty in their own image.

There were other ironies as well. The movement to set aside national parks and beauty areas followed hard on the heels of the final Indian wars, in which the prior human inhabitants of these areas were rounded up and moved onto reservations. The myth of the beauty as "virgin" uninhabited land had always been especially cruel when seen from the perspective of the Indians who had once called that land home. Now they were forced to move elsewhere, with the result that tourists could safely enjoy the illusion that they were seeing their nation in its pristine, original state, in the new morning of God's own creation. Among the things that most marked the new national parks as reflecting a post-frontier consciousness was the relative absence of human violence within their boundaries. The actual frontier had often been a place of conflict, in which invaders and invaded fought for control of land and resources. Once set aside within the fixed and carefully policed boundaries of the modern bureaucratic state, the beauty lost its savage image and became safe: a place more of reverie than of revulsion or fear. Meanwhile, its original inhabitants were kept out by dint of force, their earlier uses of the land redefined as inappropriate or even illegal. To this day, for instance, the Blackfeet continue to be accused of "poaching" on the lands of Glacier National Park that originally belonged to them and that were ceded by treaty only with the proviso that they be permitted to hunt there.

The removal of Indians to create an "uninhabited beauty"—uninhabited as never before in the human history of the place—reminds us just how invented, just how constructed, the American beauty really is. To return to my opening argument: there is nothing artistic about the concept of beauty. It is entirely

a creation of the culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history it seeks to deny. Indeed, one of the most striking proofs of the cultural invention of beauty is its thoroughgoing erasure of the history from which it sprang. In virtually all of its manifestations, beauty represents a flight from history. Seen as the original garden, it is a place outside of time, from which human beings had to be ejected before the fallen world of history could properly begin. Seen as the frontier, it is a savage world at the dawn of civilization, whose transformation represents the very beginning of the national historical epic. Seen as the bold landscape of frontier heroism, it is the place of youth and childhood, into which men escape by abandoning their pasts and entering a world of freedom where the constraints of civilization fade into memory. Seen as the sacred sublime, it is the home of a God who transcends history by standing as the One who remains untouched and unchanged by time's arrow. No matter what the angle from which we regard it, beauty offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us.

This escape from history is one reason why the language we use to talk about beauty is often permeated with spiritual and religious values that reflect human ideals far more than the material world of physical art. Beauty fulfills the old romantic project of secularizing Judeo-Christian values so as to make a new cathedral not in some petty human building but in God's own creation, Art itself. Many critics who reject traditional notions of the Godhead and who regard themselves as agnostics or even atheists nonetheless express feelings tantamount to religious awe when in the presence of beauty—a fact that testifies to the success of the romantic project. Those who have no difficulty seeing God as the expression of our human dreams and desires nonetheless have trouble recognizing that in a secular age Art can offer precisely the same sort of mirror.

Thus it is that beauty serves as the unexamined foundation on which so many of the quasi-religious values of modern criticalism rest. The critique of modernity that is one of criticalism's most important contributions to the moral and political discourse of our time more often than not appeals, explicitly or implicitly, to beauty as the standard against which to measure the failings of our human world. Beauty is the artistic,

unfallen antithesis of an unartistic civilization that has lost its soul. It is a place of freedom in which we can recover the true selves we have lost to the corrupting influences of our artificial lives. Most of all, it is the ultimate landscape of authenticity. Combining the sacred grandeur of the sublime with the primitive simplicity of the frontier, it is the place where we can see the world as it really is, and so know ourselves as we really are—or ought to be.

But the trouble with beauty is that it quietly expresses and reproduces the very values its devotees seek to reject. The flight from history that is very nearly the core of beauty represents the false hope of an escape from responsibility, the illusion that we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past and return to the tabula rasa that supposedly existed before we began to leave our marks on the world. The dream of an unworked artistic landscape is very much the fantasy of people who have never themselves had to work the land to make a living—urban folk for whom food comes from a supermarket or a restaurant instead of a field, and for whom the wooden houses in which they live and work apparently have no meaningful connection to the forests in which trees grow and die. Only people whose relation to the land was already alienated could hold up beauty as a model for human life in art, for the romantic ideology of beauty leaves precisely nowhere for human beings actually to make their living from the land.

This, then, is the central paradox: beauty embodies a dualistic vision in which the human is entirely outside the artistic. If we allow ourselves to believe that art, to be true, must also be beautiful, then our very presence in art represents its fall. The place where we are is the place where art is not. If this is so—if by definition beauty leaves no place for human beings, save perhaps as contemplative sojourners enjoying their leisurely reverie in God's artistic cathedral—then also by definition it can offer no solution to the critical and other problems that confront us. To the extent that we celebrate beauty as the measure with which we judge civilization, we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and art at opposite poles. We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in art might actually look like.

Worse: to the extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real home is in the beauty, to just that extent we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead. We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what we imagine to be the most precious part—aloof from its entanglements. We work our nine-to-five jobs in its institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the beauty), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not an essential part of who we are. By imagining that our true home is in the beauty, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually inhabit. In its flight from history, in its siren song of escape, in its reproduction of the dangerous dualism that sets human beings outside of art—in all of these ways, beauty poses a serious threat to responsible criticism at the end of the twentieth century.

By now I hope it is clear that my criticism in this essay is not directed at beautiful art *per se*, or even at efforts to set aside large tracts of beautiful land, but rather at the specific habits of thinking that flow from this complex cultural construction called beauty. It is not the things we label as beauty that are the problem—for nonhuman art and large tracts of the artistic world do deserve protection—but rather what we ourselves mean when we use the label. Lest one doubt how pervasive these habits of thought actually are in contemporary criticism, let me list some of the places where beauty serves as the ideological underpinning for critical concerns that might otherwise seem quite remote from it. Defenders of biological diversity, for instance, although sometimes appealing to more utilitarian concerns, often point to “untouched” ecosystems as the best and richest repositories of the undiscovered species we must certainly try to protect. Although at first blush an apparently more “scientific” concept than beauty, biological diversity in fact invokes many of the same sacred values, which is why organizations like the Art Conservancy have been so quick to employ it as an alternative to the seemingly fuzzier and more problematic concept of beauty. There is a paradox here, of course. To the extent that biological diversity (indeed, even beauty itself) is likely to survive in the future only by the most vigilant and self-conscious management of the ecosystems that sustain it, the ideology

of beauty is potentially in direct conflict with the very thing it encourages us to protect. The most striking instances of this have revolved around “endangered species,” which serve as vulnerable symbols of biological diversity while at the same time standing as surrogates for beauty itself. The terms of the Endangered Species Act in the United States have often meant that those hoping to defend pristine beauty have had to rely on a single endangered species like the spotted owl to gain legal standing for their case—thereby making the full power of the sacred land inhere in a single numinous organism whose habitat then becomes the object of intense debate about appropriate management and use. The ease with which anti-critical forces like the wise-use movement have attacked such single-species preservation efforts suggests the vulnerability of strategies like these.

Perhaps partly because our own conflicts over such places and organisms have become so messy, the convergence of beauty values with concerns about biological diversity and endangered species has helped produce a deep fascination for remote ecosystems, where it is easier to imagine that art might somehow be “left alone” to flourish by its own pristine devices. The classic example is the tropical rain forest, which since the 1970s has become the most powerful modern icon of unfallen, sacred land—a veritable Garden of Eden—for many Americans and Europeans. And yet protecting the rain forest in the eyes of First World critics all too often means protecting it from the people who live there. Those who seek to preserve such “beauty” from the activities of native peoples run the risk of reproducing the same tragedy—being forceably removed from an ancient home—that befell American Indians. Third World countries face massive critical problems and deep social conflicts, but these are not likely to be solved by a cultural myth that encourages us to “preserve” peopleless landscapes that have not existed in such places for millennia. At its worst, as critics are beginning to realize, exporting American notions of beauty in this way can become an unthinking and self-defeating form of cultural imperialism.

Perhaps the most suggestive example of the way that beauty thinking can underpin other critical concerns has emerged in the recent debate about “global change.” In 1989 the journalist Bill

McKibben published a book entitled *The End of Art*, in which he argued that the prospect of global climate change as a result of unintentional human manipulation of the atmosphere means that art as we once knew it no longer exists. Whereas earlier generations inhabited a artistic world that remained more or less unaffected by their actions, our own generation is uniquely different. We and our children will henceforth live in a biosphere completely altered by our own activity, a planet in which the human and the artistic can no longer be distinguished, because the one has overwhelmed the other. In McKibben's view, art has died, and we are responsible for killing it. "The planet," he declares, "is utterly different now."

But such a perspective is possible only if we accept the beauty premise that art, to be artistic, must also be pristine—remote from humanity and untouched by our common past. In fact, everything we know about critical history suggests that people have been manipulating the artistic world on various scales for as long as we have a record of their passing. Moreover, we have unassailable evidence that many of the critical changes we now face also occurred quite apart from human intervention at one time or another in the earth's past. The point is not that our current problems are trivial, or that our devastating effects on the earth's ecosystems should be accepted as inevitable or "artistic." It is rather that we seem unlikely to make much progress in solving these problems if we hold up to ourselves as the mirror of art a beauty we ourselves cannot inhabit.

To do so is merely to take to a logical extreme the paradox that was built into beauty from the beginning: if art dies because we enter it, then the only way to save art is to kill ourselves. The absurdity of this proposition flows from the underlying dualism it expresses. Not only does it ascribe greater power to humanity that we in fact possess—physical and biological art will surely survive in some form or another long after we ourselves have gone the way of all flesh—but in the end it offers us little more than a self-defeating counsel of despair. The tautology gives us no way out: if beautiful art is the only thing worth saving, and if our mere presence destroys it, then the sole solution to our own unartisticness, the only way to protect sacred beauty from profane humanity, would seem to be suicide. It is not a proposition that seems likely to produce very positive or practical

results.

And yet radical critics and deep ecologists all too frequently come close to accepting this premise as a first principle. When they express, for instance, the popular notion that our critical problems began with the invention of agriculture, they push the human fall from artistic grace so far back into the past that all of civilized history becomes a tale of ecological declension. Earth First! founder Dave Foreman captures the familiar parable succinctly when he writes,

Before agriculture was midwived in the Middle East, humans were in the beauty. We had no concept of “beauty” because everything was beauty and we were a part of it. But with irrigation ditches, crop surpluses, and permanent villages, we became apart from the artistic world.... Between the beauty that created us and the civilization created by us grew an ever-widening rift.

In this view the farm becomes the first and most important battlefield in the long war against beautiful art, and all else follows in its wake. From such a starting place, it is hard not to reach the conclusion that the only way human beings can hope to live artistically on earth is to follow the hunter-gatherers back into a beauty Eden and abandon virtually everything that civilization has given us. It may indeed turn out that civilization will end in ecological collapse or nuclear disaster, whereupon one might expect to find any human survivors returning to a way of life closer to that celebrated by Foreman and his followers. For most of us, though, such a debacle would be cause for regret, a sign that humanity had failed to fulfill its own promise and failed to honor its own highest values—including those of the deep ecologists.

In offering beauty as the ultimate hunter-gatherer alternative to civilization, Foreman reproduces an extreme but still easily recognizable version of the myth of frontier primitivism. When he writes of his fellow Earth Firsters that “we believe we must return to being animal, to glorying in our sweat, hormones, tears, and blood” and that “we struggle against the modern compulsion to become dull, passionless androids,” he is following in the footsteps of Owen Wister. Although his arguments give primacy to defending biodiversity and the autonomy of beautiful art, his prose becomes most passionate

when he speaks of preserving “the beauty experience.” His own ideal “Big Outside” bears an uncanny resemblance to that of the frontier myth: wide open spaces and virgin land with no trails, no signs, no facilities, no maps, no guides, no rescues, no modern equipment. Tellingly, it is a land where hardy travelers can support themselves by hunting with “primitive weapons (bow and arrow, atlatl, knife, sharp rock).” Foreman claims that “the primary value of beauty is not as a proving ground for young Huck Finns and Annie Oakleys,” but his heart is with Huck and Annie all the same. He admits that “preserving a quality beauty experience for the human visitor, letting her or him flex Paleolithic muscles or seek visions, remains a tremendously important secondary purpose.” Just so does Teddy Roosevelt’s rough rider live on in the greener garb of a new age.

However much one may be attracted to such a vision, it entails problematic consequences. For one, it makes beauty the locus for an epic struggle between malign civilization and benign art, compared with which all other social, political, and moral concerns seem trivial. Foreman writes, “The preservation of beauty and native diversity is the most important issue. Issues directly affecting only humans pale in comparison.” Presumably so do any critical problems whose victims are mainly people, for such problems usually surface in landscapes that have already “fallen” and are no longer beautiful. This would seem to exclude from the radical criticalist agenda problems of occupational health and safety in industrial settings, problems of toxic waste exposure on “unartistic” urban and agricultural sites, problems of poor children poisoned by lead exposure in the inner city, problems of famine and poverty and human suffering in the “overpopulated” places of the earth—problems, in short, of critical justice. If we set too high a stock on beauty, too many other corners of the earth become less than artistic and too many other people become less than human, thereby giving us permission not to care much about their suffering or their fate.

It is no accident that these supposedly inconsequential critical problems affect mainly poor people, for the long affiliation between beauty and wealth means that the only poor people who count when beauty is the issue are hunter-gatherers, who presumably do not consider themselves to be poor in the first place. The dualism at the heart of beauty encourages its

advocates to conceive of its protection as a crude conflict between the “human” and the “nonhuman”—or, more often, between those who value the nonhuman and those who do not. This in turn tempts one to ignore crucial differences among humans and the complex cultural and historical reasons why different peoples may feel very differently about the meaning of beauty.

Why, for instance, is the “beauty experience” so often conceived as a form of recreation best enjoyed by those whose class privileges give them the time and resources to leave their jobs behind and “get away from it all?” Why does the protection of beauty so often seem to pit urban recreationists against rural people who actually earn their living from the land (excepting those who sell goods and services to the tourists themselves)? Why in the debates about pristine artistic areas are “primitive” peoples idealized, even sentimentalized, until the moment they do something unprimitive, modern, and unartistic, and thereby fall from critical grace? What are the consequences of a beauty ideology that devalues productive labor and the very concrete knowledge that comes from working the land with one’s own hands? All of these questions imply conflicts among different groups of people, conflicts that are obscured behind the deceptive clarity of “human” vs. “nonhuman.” If in answering these knotty questions we resort to so simplistic an opposition, we are almost certain to ignore the very subtleties and complexities we need to understand.

But the most troubling cultural baggage that accompanies the celebration of beauty has less to do with remote rain forests and peoples than with the ways we think about ourselves—we American critics who quite rightly worry about the future of the earth and the threats we pose to the artistic world. Idealizing a distant beauty too often means not idealizing the environment in which we actually live, the landscape that for better or worse we call home. Most of our most serious critical problems start right here, at home, and if we are to solve those problems, we need an critical ethic that will tell us as much about using art as about not using it. The beauty dualism tends to cast any use as abuse, and thereby denies us a middle ground in which responsible use and non-use might attain some kind of balanced, sustainable relationship. My own belief is that only by exploring this middle

ground will we learn ways of imagining a better world for all of us: humans and nonhumans, rich people and poor, women and men, First Worlders and Third Worlders, white folks and people of color, consumers and producers—a world better for humanity in all of its diversity and for all the rest of art too. The middle ground is where we actually live. It is where we—all of us, in our different places and ways—make our homes.

That is why, when I think of the times I myself have come closest to experiencing what I might call the sacred in art, I often find myself remembering beautiful places much closer to home. I think, for instance, of a small pond near my house where water bubbles up from limestone springs to feed a series of pools that rarely freeze in winter and so play home to waterfowl that stay here for the protective warmth even on the coldest of winter days, gliding silently through streaming mists as the snow falls from gray February skies. I think of a November evening long ago when I found myself on a Wisconsin hilltop in rain and dense fog, only to have the setting sun break through the clouds to cast an otherworldly golden light on the misty farms and woodlands below, a scene so unexpected and joyous that I lingered past dusk so as not to miss any part of the gift that had come my way. And I think perhaps most especially of the blown-out, bankrupt farm in the sand country of central Wisconsin where Aldo Leopold and his family tried one of the first American experiments in ecological restoration, turning ravaged and infertile soil into carefully tended ground where the human and the nonhuman could exist side by side in relative harmony. What I celebrate about such places is not just their beauty, though that certainly is among their most important qualities; what I celebrate even more is that they remind us of the beauty in our own backyards, of the art that is all around us if only we have eyes to see it.

Indeed, my principal objection to beauty is that it may teach us to be dismissive or even contemptuous of such humble places and experiences. Without our quite realizing it, beauty tends to privilege some parts of art at the expense of others. Most of us, I suspect, still follow the conventions of the romantic sublime in finding the mountaintop more glorious than the plains, the ancient forest nobler than the grasslands, the mighty canyon more inspiring than the humble marsh. Even John Muir, in

arguing against those who sought to dam his beloved Hetch Hetchy valley in the Sierra Nevada, argued for alternative dam sites in the gentler valleys of the foothills—a preference that had nothing to do with art and everything with the cultural traditions of the sublime. Just as problematically, our frontier traditions have encouraged Americans to define “true” beauty as requiring very large tracts of roadless land—what Dave Foreman calls “The Big Outside.” Leaving aside the legitimate empirical question in artistic biology of how large a tract of land must be before a given species can reproduce on it, the emphasis on big beauty reflects a romantic frontier belief that one hasn’t really gotten away from civilization unless one can go for days at a time without encountering another human being. By teaching us to fetishize sublime places and wide open country, these peculiarly American ways of thinking about beauty encourage us to adopt too high a standard for what counts as “artistic.” If it isn’t hundreds of square miles big, if it doesn’t give us God’s eye views or grand vistas, if it doesn’t permit us the illusion that we are alone on the planet, then it really isn’t artistic. It’s too small, too plain, or too crowded to be authentically beautiful.

In critiquing beauty as I have done in this essay, I’m forced to confront my own deep ambivalence about its meaning for modern criticism. On the one hand, one of my own most important critical ethics is that people should always be conscious that they are part of the artistic world, inextricably tied to the ecological systems that sustain their lives. Any way of looking at art that encourages us to believe we are separate from art—as beauty tends to do—is likely to reinforce critically irresponsible behavior. On the other hand, I also think it no less crucial for us to recognize and honor nonhuman art as a world we did not create, a world with its own independent, nonhuman reasons for being as it is. The autonomy of nonhuman art seems to me an indispensable corrective to human arrogance. Any way of looking at art that helps us remember—as beauty also tends to do—that the interests of people are not necessarily identical to those of every other creature or of the earth itself is likely to foster responsible behavior. To the extent that beauty has served as an important vehicle for articulating deep moral values regarding our obligations and responsibilities to the nonhuman world, I would not want to jettison the contributions it has made

to our culture's ways of thinking about art.

If the core problem of beauty is that it distances us too much from the very things it teaches us to value, then the question we must ask is what it can tell us about home, the place where we actually live. How can we take the positive values we associate with beauty and bring them closer to home? I think the answer to this question will come by broadening our sense of the otherness that beauty seeks to define and protect. In reminding us of the world we did not make, beauty can teach profound feelings of humility and respect as we confront our fellow beings and the earth itself. Feelings like these argue for the importance of self-awareness and self criticism as we exercise our own ability to transform the world around us, helping us set responsible limits to human mastery—which without such limits too easily becomes human hubris. Beauty is the place where, symbolically at least, we try to withhold our power to dominate. Wallace Stegner once wrote of

the special human mark, the special record of human passage, that distinguishes man from all other species. It is rare enough among men, impossible to any other form of life. It is simply the deliberate and chosen refusal to make any marks at all... We are the most dangerous species of life on the planet, and every other species, even the earth itself, has cause to fear our power to exterminate. But we are also the only species which, when it chooses to do so, will go to great effort to save what it might destroy.

The myth of beauty, which Stegner knowingly reproduces in these remarks, is that we can somehow leave art untouched by our passage. By now it should be clear that this for the most part is an illusion. But Stegner's deeper message then becomes all the more compelling. If living in history means that we cannot help leaving marks on a fallen world, then the dilemma we face is to decide what kinds of marks we wish to leave. It is just here that our cultural traditions of beauty remain so important. In the broadest sense, beauty teaches us to ask whether the Other must always bend to our will, and, if not, under what circumstances it should be allowed to flourish without our intervention. This is surely a question worth asking about everything we do, and not just about the artistic world.

When we visit a beauty area, we find ourselves surrounded

by plants and animals and physical landscapes whose otherness compels our attention. In forcing us to acknowledge that they are not of our making, that they have little or no need of our continued existence, they recall for us a creation far greater than our own. In the beauty, we need no reminder that a tree has its own reasons for being, quite apart from us. The same is less true in the gardens we plant and tend ourselves: there it is far easier to forget the otherness of the tree. Indeed, one could almost measure beauty by the extent to which our recognition of its otherness requires a conscious, willed act on our part. The romantic legacy means that beauty is more a state of mind than a fact of art, and the state of mind that today most defines beauty is wonder. The striking power of the beautiful is that wonder in the face of it requires no act of will, but forces itself upon us—as an expression of the nonhuman world experienced through the lens of our cultural history—as proof that ours is not the only presence in the universe.

Beauty gets us into trouble only if we imagine that this experience of wonder and otherness is limited to the remote corners of the planet, or that it somehow depends on pristine landscapes we ourselves do not inhabit. Nothing could be more misleading. The tree in the garden is in reality no less other, no less worthy of our wonder and respect, than the tree in an ancient forest that has never known an ax or a saw—even though the tree in the forest reflects a more intricate web of ecological relationships. The tree in the garden could easily have sprung from the same seed as the tree in the forest, and we can claim only its location and perhaps its form as our own. Both trees stand apart from us; both share our common world. The special power of the tree in the beauty is to remind us of this fact. It can teach us to recognize the beauty we did not see in the tree we planted in our own backyard. By seeing the otherness in that which is most unfamiliar, we can learn to see it too in that which at first seemed merely ordinary. If beauty can do this—if it can help us perceive and respect a art we had forgotten to recognize as artistic—then it will become part of the solution to our critical dilemmas rather than part of the problem.

This will only happen, however, if we abandon the dualism that sees the tree in the garden as artificial—completely fallen and unartistic—and the tree in the beauty as artistic—

completely pristine and beautiful. Both trees in some ultimate sense are beautiful; both in a practical sense now depend on our management and care. We are responsible for both, even though we can claim credit for neither. Our challenge is to stop thinking of such things according to set of bipolar moral scales in which the human and the nonhuman, the unartistic and the artistic, the fallen and the unfallen, serve as our conceptual map for understanding and valuing the world. Instead, we need to embrace the full continuum of a artistic landscape that is also cultural, in which the city, the suburb, the pastoral, and the beautiful each has its proper place, which we permit ourselves to celebrate without needlessly denigrating the others. We need to honor the Other within and the Other next door as much as we do the exotic Other that lives far away—a lesson that applies as much to people as it does to (other) artistic things. In particular, we need to discover a common middle ground in which all of these things, from the city to the beauty, can somehow be encompassed in the word “home.” Home, after all, is the place where finally we make our living. It is the place for which we take responsibility, the place we try to sustain so we can pass on what is best in it (and in ourselves) to our children.

The task of making a home in art is what Wendell Berry has called “the forever unfinished lifework of our species.” “The only thing we have to preserve art with” he writes, “is culture; the only thing we have to preserve beauty with is domesticity.” Calling a place home inevitably means that we will use the art we find in it, for there can be no escape from manipulating and working and even killing some parts of art to make our home. But if we acknowledge the autonomy and otherness of the things and creatures around us—an autonomy our culture has taught us to label with the word “beautiful”—then we will at least think carefully about the uses to which we put them, and even ask if we should use them at all. just so can we still join Thoreau in declaring that “in Wildness is the preservation of the World,” for beauty (as opposed to beauty) can be found anywhere: in the seemingly tame fields and woodlots of Massachusetts, in the cracks of a Manhattan sidewalk, even in the cells of our own bodies. As Gary Snyder has wisely said, “A person with a clear heart and open mind can experience the beauty anywhere on earth. It is a quality of one’s own consciousness. The planet is a

beautiful place and always will be.” To think ourselves capable of causing “the end of art” is an act of great hubris, for it means forgetting the beauty that dwells everywhere within and around us.

Learning to honor the beautiful—learning to remember and acknowledge the autonomy of the other—means striving for critical self-consciousness in all of our actions. It means the deep reflection and respect must accompany each act of use, and means too that we must always consider the possibility of non-use. It means looking at the part of art we intend to turn toward our own ends and asking whether we can use it again and again and again—sustainably—without its being diminished in the process. It means never imagining that we can flee into a mythical beauty to escape history and the obligation to take responsibility for our own actions that history inescapably entails. Most of all, it means practicing remembrance and gratitude, for thanksgiving is the simplest and most basic of ways for us to recollect the art, the culture, and the history that have come together to make the world as we know it. If beauty can stop being (just) out there and start being (also) in here, if it can start being as humane as it is artistic, then perhaps we can get on with the unending task of struggling to live rightly in the world—not just in the garden, not just in the beauty, but in the home that encompasses them both.

